324th motorized rifle regiment in the first Chechen war 1995

The 324th regiment was formed as follows: almost completely, with the exception of 4 people who remained in the permanent composition of the regiment at the beginning of 1995, the officer corps was completed at the expense of units of the garrisons of Yekaterinburg, Verkhnyaya Pyshma, Elani, Chebarkul - i.e. from almost all of the Ural Military District. As a replenishment, transport planes with privates and partly officers from the Gusinoozersk garrison were sent from the Trans-Baikal Military District. Thus, the officers of the 324th regiment at first did not even know each other by sight, not to mention their subordinate soldiers. The regiment was given a week to conduct combat coordination. From February to mid-April 1995, a special forces group from the city of Kyakhta (ZabVO) was attached to the regiment.

According to Konstantin Pulikovsky, this unit was one of the most efficient and well trained.

The militants christened the regiment "red dogs", since many officers in the regiment let go of beards, which in the sun had acquired a red hue.

At the end of January 1995 he left Yekaterinburg for Tolstoy-Yurt. On the night of January 21, 1995, while unloading a train at Terek station (Republic of North Ossetia), they fired at, as a result of which one of the soldiers was wounded in the leg. On January 22, 1995, units of the 324th regiment lined up in a marching column, made a march through the Tersk ridge and settled not far from the village of Tolstoy-Yurt, which is about 20 km from Grozny.

By February 1, 166 motorized rifle brigades and 324 motorized rifle brigades were concentrated in the area east of Khankala. Thus, the eastern direction of Grozny was finally blocked.

On the morning of February 3, two regiments (324 and 245 mega-rifle regiments) of the Yugo-Vostok grouping of troops carried out a maneuver from the Khankala region to the south and southeast of Grozny. 324 MRR, advancing under the incessant enemy mortar fire, saddled the Prigorodnoye, Gikalovsky road, set up checkpoints at the main intersections and ensured the escort of the main forces of the 245 MRR and part of the rear with ammunition. After 2 days, the Dudayevites, who had received earlier reinforcements, through a corridor covered by motorized riflemen were forced to stop resistance in the area of Minutka Square.

Capture and retention of the settlement of Gikalovsky: the regiment moved along a bypass road running along the southeastern outskirts of Grozny, through the areas of Neftepromysla and Chernorechye. The advance detachment, consisting of a motorized rifle company and two mortar crews, as well as a tank platoon, passed Chernorechye at speed and rushed along the highway to the village of Gikalovsky. When the vanguard burst into Gikalovsky, no one expected him. Several militants were taken prisoner and, after a short search and interrogation, were shot. The main forces of the regiment could not break through to Gikalovsky, as a result, by the evening of February 3, the battalion was almost completely surrounded.

The militants began to draw up their forces to the village of Chechen-Aul, located 3 km from Gikalovsky. At 5 o'clock in the morning on February 4, 1995, the battle broke out with new strength... First, the militants, hiding behind a thick veil of fog, went out through the thickets of elm and along the canal bed to the rear of the tank platoon's positions and almost point-blank shot two tanks from grenade launchers. The militants' attacks on the positions of the 3rd battalion continued for 7 hours. Having received a rebuff, the militants stopped trying to attack head-on and retreated to Chechen-Aul. The battalion lost 18 people killed, 50 wounded. The tank company lost 5 vehicles, which were mostly destroyed in the first minutes of the battle.

On March 13, the 324th regiment launched an offensive against the positions of the militants in the area of the settlements of Chechen-Aul and Starye Atagi. The purpose of the offensive is to capture the crossing of the Argun River. As a result of the 8-hour battle, the militants were pushed back to the river, and their stronghold in the area of the small-scale commodity farm was practically destroyed. But as a result of a mismatch between the actions of the 1st and 3rd battalions, a gap of about 800 m appeared between them and the regiment retreated to its original positions. On March 15, a second offensive began on the positions of the militants.

Then he attacked Chechen-Aul, participated in all major operations: Argun, Gudermes, Vedeno.

Since the spring of 1995, the area of responsibility is in the Dargo region.

Mid-March 1995 - in the group "South"

end of March 1995 - Shawls. 3/324 MSP started a battle in the PTF area, south-west. elevation 251.3, elevation 277.5 (south-west of Shali), providing actions from the rear of 503 MTR and 141 otblocking of Shali.

Throughout April 1995, the 324th regiment did not undertake active hostilities. However, on average per day, as a result of actions Chechen snipers 1-2 people in the regiment were injured or killed. To combat snipers, a combat group on duty was assigned as part of a motorized rifle platoon on the BMP-1, which periodically combed the area around the regiment's location.

At the beginning of April 1995, a replenishment arrived in the regiment - about 200 people, which were distributed mainly between the 1st and 3rd motorized rifle battalions. In the 1st battalion, the fighters from the replenishment immediately joined the divisions, and in the 3rd they were formed into three training platoons, the commanders of which were young. In the replenishment of the 3rd battalion, two weeks later, a young soldier, a Baptist by his religious convictions, hanged himself.

May-June 1995 - Campaign in the mountains. On the shatoi direction. On the night of June 9-10, 324 MSR occupied and equipped strong points (checkpoints) in the area 1.5 km north of Malye Varanda. On June 11, 324 MSR by the end of the day captured the line 2 km north-west of Malye Varanda, Mamyshasty, 1 km north of the Zone, and continued to advance in the direction of Bolshiye Varanda.

On June 12, 324 MRR part of the forces blocked the western outskirts of the Zone, ensured the entry into battle of 245 MRR and continued to advance in the direction of Sovetskoe (Shatoi).

On June 13-18, the 324th infantry regiment continued to block and destroy groups of militants in the fortified area they occupied on the western outskirts of the Zone. By the morning of June 19, the regiment, by night actions, in cooperation with part of the forces of the 104th infantry regiment and the 7th airborne infantry division, had completely blocked, and by 17.00 had completed the clearing of the settlement and the surrounding areas from the remnants of the militants.

On May 24, the 104th Airborne Division and 324 MTR, with the support of aviation and artillery, went on the offensive, attacked the enemy in the Duba-Yurt, Chishki area, 3 km west of Dachu-Borzoi, and by the end of May 26 reached the northern outskirts of Chishka and Dachu-Borzoi.

May 7, 1996 - Goiskoye (reinforced battalion) with 166th and 136th OMRB. At 10.00 he attacked the village from the eastern side and by 15.00 captured the village.

Having outdated weapons (the main infantry unit in the regiment was the BMP-1), the 324 msp, nevertheless, was known as one of the most militant in the group.

The regiment was withdrawn from Chechnya on August 2, 1996. 171 servicemen were killed, 9 were reported missing. On August 10, the regiment's subdivisions were already loading into echelons to return home, when a new order came: to enter Grozny in three consolidated columns and clear several blocks in the city center of militants. By the end of the day on August 11, the battalions completed their assigned task, taking control of all the indicated quarters. This cost the regiment 39 more dead and more than a hundred wounded. After that, the regiment remained in Grozny for another 2 weeks. Then, after the withdrawal from Grozny, he camped in Khankala for another month.

ZKVR 3 minbatr 324 mr Lieutenant Georgy Aleksandrovich Skipsky: "The 324th regiment was formed as follows: almost completely, with the exception of 4 people who remained in the regular composition of the regiment at the beginning of 1995, the officer corps was staffed at the expense of parts of the garrisons of Yekaterinburg, Verkhnyaya Pyshma, Elani, Chebarkul - that is, from almost all of the Ural Military District. As a replenishment, transport planes with privates and partly officers from the garrison of Gusinoozersk were sent from the Trans-Baikal Military District. Thus, the officers of the 324th regiment were not at first even knew each other by sight, not to mention their subordinate soldiers, with whom they soon had to go into battle. "1

ZKVR 3 minbatr 324 msp Lieutenant G.A. Skipsky: "On January 22, 1995, units of the 324th regiment lined up in a marching column, marched through the Tersky ridge and positioned themselves near the village of Tolstoy-Yurt, which is about 20 km from Grozny."

NSh SKVO Lieutenant-General Vladimir Yakovlevich Potapov: "The final stage of the operation to defeat illegal armed groups in Grozny began in the morning on February 3. Two regiments (324 and 245 infantry regiments) of the South-East group of forces carried out a maneuver from the Khankala region to the south and southeast of Grozny. "3

Nomination to n of the item Gikalovsky

ZKVR 3 minbatr 324 msp Lieutenant G.A. Skipsky: "Having received the order to capture and hold the settlement of Gikalovsky, the commander of the 324th regiment, Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Sidorov, organized a move along the bypass road along the southeastern outskirts of Grozny, through the suburban areas - Neftepromysly and Chernorechye." 4

From the description of the battle: "The deputy regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir [Pavlovich] Bakhmetov, only took three platoons with him: reconnaissance, infantry fighting vehicles and a tank." Enough, - they decided. “We’ll hold out a little, and then the rest will do.” “5

From the description of the battle: "[Commander of the 324th infantry regiment] Colonel [Anatoly V.] Sidorov really assessed the situation and decided to move not along the highway and not bypassing the small village [Prigorodnoye], but through the garden plots." 6

ZKVR 3 minbatr 324 msp Lieutenant G.A. Skipsky: “Before reaching Chernorechye, our column, which was marching in the vanguard, unexpectedly turned off the road into the forest plantation zone and, clinging to the soles of the dominant heights, began to crawl into the greenery like a winding snake. When the column passed no more than 2 km, it was fired upon The mines fell at a sufficiently large distance, which made it possible to observe the trajectory of their flight and not be afraid of being hit by shrapnel (the spread of mortar mine fragments reaches 200 m in radius). This meant that the militants noticed our column too late, so their fire turned out to be unintended. Our vanguard, consisting of a motorized rifle company and two mortar crews, as well as a tank platoon, passed Chernorechye at speed, sweeping away the few pickets of the militants on the way, and rushed along the highway to the village of Gikalovsky, between which and the outskirts of Grozny we did not meet any serious resistance. "7

From the description of the battle: "We moved out onto the track. And suddenly it seemed to foam. Shrapnel of mortar mines and torn pieces of asphalt rained down on the armored group. Walking to the left of the rest of the armored personnel carriers, a wave from a mine that exploded a meter away was literally thrown and lowered onto wheels already pierced along one side.<...>The column rushed forward. Coming out of the shelling, Bakhmetov immediately contacted the regiment commander. Transferred the coordinates of the enemy mortar battery. But he completely switched to solving the task before him only when he heard his callsign in the headphones of the headset, and then the message:
- Order. The target is hit. Continue driving. "8

From the description of the battle: "A truck full of militants was approaching. They hit it from a tank. Who of the" spirits "survived - scattered. where did he just get it?) suddenly grabbed a grenade and with a shout: "Allah akbar!" - swung at the soldiers. Did not have time. the breeding farm, where the armored group was going, there were about forty-five militants and that they were at the crossroads near the bazaar. And most importantly, from the side from which the Bakhmetovites are coming, no one is waiting for them. A little further, behind the state farm, there is a whole stronghold. on the map: there is no bazaar near the intersection. Not marked. We decided to sort it out on the spot. "9

In n. Gikalovsky

From the description of the battle: "The combat vehicles of the armored group jumped out from behind the bend. They immediately sorted out the situation. Precisely, there is a market near the road. Or rather, several" Shanghai ". The militants at first did not really even take the fight. . On the grills, even the skewers with kebabs remained intact. "10

ZKVR 3 minbatr 324 msp Lieutenant G.A. Skipsky: “When our vanguard burst into Gikalovsky, no one expected him. The militants fled so hastily that they threw away all their property and documents. There were boilers in the courtyard, in which hot pilaf was still smoking. militants, found the lists of the personnel of the detachment of the field commander Isa Madaev, in whose area of responsibility were the southern outskirts of Grozny<...>... The trophies of the mortars were a staff van based on the GAZ-66, as well as several sets of field camouflage uniforms stylized as a mountain national costume. Several militants were taken prisoner and, after a short search and interrogation, were shot. There was no point in sending them to the rear, since we did not have one.
After the 3rd battalion broke through Chernorechye, the militants organized a tighter fire barrier, as a result of which not all units of the 324th regiment were able to slip through the greenhouse without losses. In our mortar battery, as a result of shelling, the car that closed the column, loaded with various field equipment, was knocked out. The remains of the car had to be transported in tow, attaching it with a cable to the BMP. "11

From the description of the battle: "And the resistance was getting fiercer. It happened that Bakhmetov's fighters had to rip boxes of cartridges from armored vehicles on the move, which were specially hung on the armor against cumulative shots in order to replenish their ammunition. And yet the resistance of the Dudayevites was broken."

Militants counterattack

From the description of the battle: “By four o'clock in the evening, the commander arrived at the new location of the regiment. deployed a mortar battery to battle.
Intelligence by that time reported that a cluster of Dudayevites' cars of about fifty pieces had been discovered. Prepare for the nomination. The regiment commander, Colonel Anatoly Sidorov, immediately contacted the artillery. Requested fire.<...>Well done, gunners! They did a great job then. The regiment came to the rescue.
The battle lasted until eleven. Cruel. Persistent. But the approaching night gradually took its toll.
The cannonade has died down, there is no point in planting shells in the darkness as a pretty penny.
And on the KNP regiment the "battle" lasted all night. Worked out different options forthcoming actions, their tactical position and the militants were assessed, orders and orders were given. Everyone who was there that night marveled at their commander. Not a shadow of confusion on my face. Clarity and confidence in actions, in what is said. He only smoked an unusually large amount - three packs of cigarettes in a few hours. The officers could no longer stand it, took the smoke. Instead, they put bags of breadcrumbs on the table: you need to take care of a sensible commander. "

Night outing in n. Prigorodnoye

From the description of the battle: “Zhuravlev was the commander of a tank platoon in Chechnya as part of the 324th motorized rifle regiment. All tanks were scattered among motorized rifle subunits to reinforce them, and Zhuravlev's platoon was attached to the company of Captain Oleg Deryabin.
Located near the village. Prigorodny (southeastern outskirts of Grozny), motorized riflemen and tankers began to await further instructions. It was January, and the silence over the white field in the disposition of our soldiers looked natural and peaceful. The suburban did not show any unfriendliness, and the white Zhiguli that drove past our positions were, as it were, a confirmation that the locals had no stone in their bosom. "Zhigulenok" disappeared, and a little later shelling began from the direction of Prigorodnoye.
In the evening, the officers excitedly summed up the day. The result was in favor of the militants, because the Urals fired back not at the enemy, but only in its direction. None of those present knew how long they would have to be in these positions. But everyone, including Zhuravlev, understood that the next shelling could begin at any minute.
- Who is with me? - Deryabin asked, deciding on a night trip to the village. There were a lot of people willing, but only twelve went. The rest of the company commander left with the personnel.
They took their personal weapons and went out. Special binoculars, allowing you to see at least something in the pitch darkness of the black southern night, was only one of a dozen brave ones. It was he who made it possible to detect a group of militants coming towards ...
Deryabin was the first to open fire, and a burst of machine-gun fire, breaking the silence, knocked down one of the Chechens. The rest, firing back, began to retreat behind the houses, while ours continued to hit them with machine guns. After a while, the shooting ended, and the militants fled. The officers approached the dead enemy lying in a pool of blood. The killed Chechen was found with a military ID, which was used to determine that he served in airborne troops, as well as lists of names and phone numbers in Rostov-on-Don, Stavropol and other cities in the North Caucasus. Subsequently, it turned out that this was the chief of intelligence of one of the large bandit formations.
Inspired by the success of the first battle, the daredevils went further along Prigorodnoye. The curved streets of the village with numerous bends limited visibility, so that even binoculars translucent in the darkness did not help. Therefore, they walked quietly and listened. Suddenly Zhuravlev heard the hum of a "Zhiguli" engine, familiar from childhood. After a few seconds, no one doubted that it was the Zhiguli that was slowly moving towards it. Hiding around the corner, they waited for the car to appear from the bend of the narrow village street. The car that appeared was white- the same as the one that drove by during the day before the shelling. There were four militants in it. They were shot at point-blank range.
Satisfied, hung with trophies, without a single scratch, the twelve officers returned to their own. "13

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

1 Skipsky G. Lessons from the First Chechen Campaign // Russia and Soviet Union in local wars and armed conflicts of the twentieth century. Ekaterinburg, 2002.S. 219-235. (http://chechnya.genstab.ru/art_324reg.htm)
2 Skipsky G. Lessons of the First Chechen Campaign // Russia and the Soviet Union in local wars and armed conflicts of the 20th century. Ekaterinburg, 2002.S. 219-235. (http://chechnya.genstab.ru/art_324reg.htm)
3 Potapov V. Actions of formations, units and subunits of the ground forces during a special operation to disarm illegal armed groups in 1994-96. on the territory of the Chechen Republic.
4 Skipsky G. Lessons of the First Chechen Campaign // Russia and the Soviet Union in Local Wars and Armed Conflicts of the 20th Century. Ekaterinburg, 2002.S. 219-235. (http://chechnya.genstab.ru/art_324reg.htm)
5 Belousov Y. There are no combat draws // Remember and bow. Ekaterinburg, 2000.S. 318.
6 Khanmamedov A. The regiment that returned ... // Ural military vedomosti. 1996.2 August.
7 Skipsky G. Lessons of the First Chechen Campaign // Russia and the Soviet Union in Local Wars and Armed Conflicts of the 20th Century. Ekaterinburg, 2002.S. 219-235. (http://chechnya.genstab.ru/art_324reg.htm)
8 Belousov Y. There are no combat draws // Remember and bow. Ekaterinburg, 2000.S. 319.
9 Belousov Y. There are no combat draws // Remember and bow. Ekaterinburg, 2000.S. 319.
10 Belousov Y. There are no combat draws // Remember and bow. Ekaterinburg, 2000.S. 319.
11 Skipsky G. Lessons of the First Chechen Campaign // Russia and the Soviet Union in Local Wars and Armed Conflicts of the 20th Century. Ekaterinburg, 2002.S. 219-235. (http://chechnya.genstab.ru/art_324reg.htm)
12 Belousov Y. There are no combat draws // Remember and bow. Ekaterinburg, 2000.S. 319.
13 Tikhonov I. War and Peace of Captain Zhuravlev // Remember and Bow. Ekaterinburg, 2000.S. 87.

The dual power that developed in Chechnya in 1991, which declared itself a sovereign republic, led to a confrontation with the federal government and internal conflicts in the struggle for power, which ended with the introduction of Russian troops in December 1994. So it began to participate in which not all the military leadership of the country wanted. But if the generals could resign and avoid being sent to the North Caucasus, then the conscripts and junior officers simply had no choice. In a hurry, regiments were replenished and sent off to carry out a combat mission in Chechnya. The 245th, who lost a significant part of its personnel in the course of hostilities, did not escape this fate. The most dramatic battle was the battle near the village of Yaryshmardy on April 16, 1996, which took place exactly twenty years ago.

245th SME

The 245th regiment has the rank of Guards for its heroic history during the Great Patriotic War. Quartered in the Nizhny Novgorod region, within ten days of January 1995 after the failed operation of the federal forces to capture Grozny, he began to actively replenish with military recruits under wartime conditions. Its contingent has grown 10 times and amounted to 1,700 people due to the recruitment from the KDVO (Red Banner Far Eastern Military District). In addition to recruits, volunteers who had not received the necessary training were also conscripted. On the eve of entering Chechnya, the fighters did not have a single joint exercise to work out interaction.

Considering that already in the North Caucasus 4 sets of officers will be replaced in the regiment, it becomes clear from his example that the army was not prepared for participation in the First Chechen campaign and was doomed to losses. Only killed in 245 SMRs, they will be 220 people, including the son of Lieutenant General Pulikovsky (December 1995) and those guys who laid down their heads during another 20 military operations. The bloodiest battle was near the village of Yashmardy, which caused a huge public outcry.

In the war zone

The 245th MRR was always at the forefront, participating in the assault on Prigorodnoye (Grozny), Goisky, Vedeno, Arkhtan-Yurt, Shatoi and Gotov. Since the spring of the 95th, the regiment settled not far from Shatoi, guarded roads and was on duty at checkpoints. The soldiers accompanied the transport convoys carrying fuel, food and civilians. Beginning in February 1995, after the encirclement and blocking of Dudayev's main troops in the South-East group of forces, strange events related to concessions to the separatists began to occur more and more often.

During the operation to capture Shatoi in June 1995, a column of the 245th regiment was ambushed near the village of Zona in the Argun Gorge. This happened due to the carelessness of the leadership and the lack of pedestrian reconnaissance. Despite the losses, this fact remained almost unnoticed in the general jubilation associated with the capture of Shatoy. But this was the first call to the tragedy, which went down in history as the battle at Yaryshmarda. On March 31, 1996, a convoy of paratroopers near the village of Benoy, heading for Vedeno, was shot, but this did not prompt the command to increase security measures when passing through the gorge.

What preceded the April events

On April 4, the administration of the village of Yaryshmardy signed a peace treaty with the federal troops, which imposed a ban on the conduct of hostilities in the area. On the basis of a document from the chief of staff of the 324th Rifle Regiment, which controlled the section of the road to Shatoi, a checkpoint 500 meters from the village was removed. The regiment commander was not informed.

The battle at Yaryshmarda will take place in the context of an order from the Minister of Defense on the use of artillery only in case of self-defense and a complete refusal to participate in aviation on the territory of Chechnya. He came through secret communication channels about ten days before the convoy left Khankala.

The shot column

The central base of the 245th MRP prepared a convoy on Shatoi, the purpose of which was to deliver material and technical means, fuel and young reinforcements to the military unit. The convoy was joined by the demobilized and sent home for family reasons. There is information that there were also soldiers' mothers looking for their missing children. From Goiskoye, 4 cars of the 324th MRP joined them. The rear column under the command of Major Terzovets left on April 15, right after Easter. After spending the night in Khankala, by the middle of the next day, cars and military equipment passed Dacha-Borzoi and Yaryshmardy, stretching for 1.5-2 km. Ahead was a narrow mountain serpentine, which is commonly called "mother-in-law's tongue".

The reconnaissance controlled the artillery spotter kept in touch with the 324th MRP, and this was all that was done to protect people and military equipment... The battle at Yaryshmarda was filmed by the militants themselves, whose material became public. Against the background of the singing of birds and the conversations of the detachment of Jordanian Khattab and Ruslan Gelayev, the hum of cars is heard. It can be seen from behind the branches from the cliff, as the awning "Ural", a filler, an armored personnel carrier appear. The distance between cars is about 20 meters. And suddenly the silence is broken by explosions, and then gunfire. With dense fire from a height, invisible behind the greenery and a curtain of smoke, the militants shoot at point-blank range the Russian convoy. The video recorded the time - 13 hours 23 minutes. These are the minutes when the battle at Yaryshmarda began.

Battle scheme

The presented diagram shows that the militants were deliberately waiting for the convoy, equipping up to 20 points for a fire strike. Trenches were specially dug in the rocks, which is a very time-consuming task. All the places where the gang of Khattab and Gelayev are stationed are equipped with a sufficient number of weapons. They are located on both sides, which allows you to shoot through all sections of the path. Radio-controlled land mines are installed on the road in the direction of traffic. An ideal location for the attack due to the bend that hides the head transport from the tail of the column. The road in this place is so narrow that it is impossible for the tankers or trucks to turn around to leave the scene of the battle.

On the left there is an almost sheer cliff, on the right there is a cliff about five meters high, under which the Argun River flows. During the heavy fire, some of the soldiers managed to jump into the dry river. Those who did not crash during the fall were finished off by snipers, which made it impossible to escape. The trap for the transport convoy slammed shut when the tank at the head was blown up by a land mine and an explosion was heard at the end of the procession. The bandits hit the target clearly, shooting in the first minutes of the battle the infantry fighting vehicles and armored reconnaissance vehicles leading the column. Senior Major Terezovets, a radio operator and an artillery spotter were killed. Company 245 MRP found itself without communication with the outside world (there was a special interference in the VHF range), without control and support from artillery and aviation. The battle at Yaryshmarda turned into a real massacre for Russian soldiers and officers.

1996: tragic events through the eyes of eyewitnesses

According to the 245th MRR, during the bloody events, 73 people died, 52 were wounded, 6 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 armored reconnaissance vehicle, 11 vehicles were destroyed. "Komsomolskaya Pravda" published an article, which lists 95 dead, taking into account the demobilized and those who joined the convoy, whose presence was not officially recorded by anyone. It is easy to believe in this, because the mother of the deceased machine gunner Oleg Ogoreltsev, one of the demobilized, had to search for her son in Chechnya for a month and she was able to identify the corpse in Rostov only after meeting with the surviving participants in the dramatic events. Thirty bodies were taken out of the battlefield without the possibility of identification: the guys burned out like torches after direct hits from grenade launchers into the nalivniki and infantry fighting vehicles. What do eyewitnesses say about the battle at Yaryshmarda?

Sniper Denis Barber, a contract soldier, says that after the smoke cleared, the surviving soldiers resisted until the last bullet in conditions of almost zero visibility. After the battle, seven corpses of militants - residents of the Shatoy region will be found. Only at 6 o'clock in the evening, the armored group of Miroshnichenko and the 324th MRR, as well as a battered reconnaissance detachment, made their way to the column. By this time, the Chechens and Arab mercenaries participating in the Khattab gang had already fled. Only one question was asked: why did help come so late? The head BRDM resisted to the last, the guys could have stayed alive. To which the answer followed: the command of the regiment was waiting for instructions from above, and the groups began to make their way to help only at four o'clock. The turntables that flew up beat the mountains, the artillery beat down, but there were no more militants on the slopes.

Igor Izotov, who was in the third truck, said that those who managed to squeeze into the patch between the front BMP and the rocks, which became the only dead zone for the enemy, survived. The guys were getting out from under the cars by snipers, firing ricocheted against the asphalt.

The wounded Sergei Cherchik recalls that, despite the fire, there was mutual assistance between the soldiers. He, wounded by a shrapnel, was pulled out from under the car by a contract soldier, and when he was hit patella, two of them were rescued by a conscript soldier.

Eternal memory to the lost

The fact that the convoy was expected and Khattab had complete information about its composition is evidenced by the fact that the most important vehicles... The medical vehicle remained intact. The wounded were gathered in it, and the bodies of the dead were laid on the armor. When the MTLB began to unfold, its wheels hovered over the cliff. The driver miraculously managed to straighten the car, but the bodies of the already dead guys fell into Argun. All morning on the 17th, they cleared the road, finding seven more unexploded land mines. Burnt trucks were thrown off a cliff, looking for things and personal numbers of soldiers. Thus ended the almost four-hour battle at Yaryshmarda.

The death toll of 245 SMRs includes 11 officers, including the artillery spotter Captain Vyatkin, who met death in the first minutes of the battle, Captain Lakhin, Major Milovanov, 2 warrant officers and 27 soldiers and sergeants. Among them, 8 33 remained unidentified, and long time their surnames, like the machine gunner Ogoreltsev, were established with the help of their parents and relatives. A memory book is posted on the website of 245 SMEs, and a monument to those who fulfilled their lives at the cost of their lives is erected in the Nizhny Novgorod region.

Official investigation

The mass death of the personnel of 245 SMRs became the subject of an official investigation, as a result of which the prosecutor's office appeared in the State Duma, which did not see the corpus delicti in the actions of officials. Rokhlin blamed the country's leadership and the Ministry of Defense for not controlling the situation in Chechnya and for allowing the manifestation of disorder, which resulted in the death of the military. He pointed to a loss of vigilance, tactical illiteracy and a lack of interaction between the 245th and 324th SMEs. But no one, including the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Romanikhin, was punished for the dramatic battle at Yaryshmarda.

20 years later

On May 5, 1996, the newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda" published the first article about the tragedy with the column of the 245th SMR, which on the sidelines immediately began to be called sold. In a video message, Khattab openly speaks of the venality of some of the high-ranking officers. But you cannot believe him, a thorough judicial investigation is needed, which should answer the question of the reasons for the terrible coincidences and the mass death of soldiers. But to date, no such proceedings have been carried out. One of the mysteries of the First Chechen War is the April battle at Yaryshmarda. Military secrets have been closely guarded since the time when the participants in the events were strictly forbidden to convey the details and details of the terrible tragedy to everyone, including journalists. Today their memoirs have been published, but they do not contain answers to the main question: why is the command not responsible for the lives of its soldiers? ..

Georgy Alexandrovich Skipsky - Cand. ist. Sci., teacher of the Yekaterinburg branch of the Academy of State fire service Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation, Major of Internal Service (Yekaterinburg). He took part in hostilities in the Chechen Republic as part of the 324th motorized rifle regiment in the position of deputy commander of the 3-n mortar battery for work with personnel from January 21 to May 10, 1995.

Russian history has repeatedly proved that its lessons begin to be taken into account only after repeated repetition of the mistakes made by predecessors. The same incident happened with the First Chechen Campaign, though. it would seem that our country already had a bitter experience of the war in Afghanistan, and our grandfathers paid for it too dearly in the fields of the Great Patriotic War.

Undoubtedly, when deciding to send Russian troops into the Chechen Republic, the country's top military and political leadership did not realize the consequences of this step. Moreover, the "shap-handed" mood prevailed for the umpteenth time. The military side of the operation was not well planned at all. This can be confirmed by the following example: in the first period of the campaign, which can be conditionally determined by the chronological framework: December 1994 - March 1995, the supply of the federal group in the republic took place to a greater extent by the method of self-sufficiency. This meant that most of the food the servicemen often received not in the field kitchens, but as a result of requisitions from the local population. The quality of food in the early days was below any criticism. When making a march in the 324th regiment, a soldier was entitled to a can of canned barley porridge with meat (more precisely, with a hint of its presence) and a third of a loaf of frozen bread per day. The shortage of food was compensated for by the stocks of the population, prepared for the winter and abandoned in their homes during the flight of Chechens from lowland auls to mountainous regions, where fighting unfolded only in May 1995.

Another example can be cited. The use of units from all military districts for a military operation seems strange, if we proceed from the use of the surprise factor. Bringing units of the North Caucasian Military District to full combat readiness and their redeployment to the borders of the Chechen Republic could be carried out in a shorter time than the transfer of military echelons from the Urals or Transbaikalia. One can, of course, object to this by the fact that the facts of transporting military echelons with equipment and personnel would have remained unknown to D. Dudayev, but such a position became similar to that of an ostrich, if we proceed from modern reconnaissance capabilities, as well as the good knowledge of the Chechen leadership about the plans The Kremlin. When our echelon was standing on a siding near the town of Mineralnye Vody, a guard with warning shots stopped an attempt to approach it by a group of suspicious persons who were wandering around the train, which was far enough from the city at night. That is, even before our echelon arrived at the place of unloading, Dudayev's informants already had information about it. On the night of January 21, 1995, while unloading a train at Terek station (Republic of North Ossetia), we were fired upon, as a result of which one of the soldiers was wounded in the leg. The North Caucasus greeted us so hospitably on the first day of our stay.

On January 22, 1995, units of the 324th regiment lined up in a marching column, made a march through the Tersk ridge and settled not far from the village of Tolstoy-Yurt, which is about 20 km from Grozny. Unlike the 276th motorized rifle regiment, which, after unloading equipment and a long march, was immediately thrown into the assault on Grozny, our regiment was given a week to conduct military coordination in order to avoid the heavy losses that our fellow countrymen from the 276th regiment in Grozny suffered. It really gave positive results, as it turned out later. Indeed, if we had been thrown into battle as well as the 276th regiment, then the losses would have been even greater than in it. The fact is that to staff the 276th regiment, officers were sent from the entire 34th motorized rifle division, so they at least visually knew each other and their soldiers, the 324th regiment was formed as follows: almost completely, with the exception of 4 people, remaining in the permanent composition of the regiment at the beginning of 1995, the officer corps was completed at the expense of units of the garrisons of Yekaterinburg, Verkhnyaya Pyshma, Elan, Chebarkul - i.e. from almost all of the Ural Military District. As a replenishment, transport planes with privates and partly officers from the Gusinoozersk garrison were sent from the Trans-Baikal Military District. Thus, the officers of the 324th regiment at first did not even know each other by sight, not to mention their subordinate soldiers, with whom they soon had to go into battle.

The hostilities in the initial period of the campaign showed that the command and control system for carrying out combat missions was not at all suitable for the military-political situation in the Chechen Republic. To perform an elementary maneuver or to solve an immediate tactical task, coordination of actions was required at the level of, at least, the headquarters of the united grouping of federal forces in the republic. At the same time, the militants very rarely brought forces larger than a company or battalion into battle, which made their actions very unpredictable for the Russian troops, making it difficult to observe, not to mention the possibility of conducting reconnaissance.

Favorite trick Chechen fighters began the use of small groups, usually consisting of a machine gunner, a sniper and a grenade launcher. The grenade launcher struck armored vehicles, the sniper - the officers, and the machine gunner created a fire barrier for the troika to exit the zone of return fire of Russian units in an organized manner. This tactic was used by the separatists not only in Grozny, but also in clashes with federal forces in the field, and in particular during the offensive of the 1st and 3rd motorized rifle battalions of the 324th regiment in mid-March 1995 in the area of Chechen-Aul and Starye Atagi, which will be discussed in more detail later.

Under these conditions, a successful outcome of the battle for the Russian troops was achieved only if the commander of the unit or subunit took responsibility and made a decision based on the immediate situation, which was changing much faster than the headquarters of the combined group could react to. Most a shining example The regiment began to move to the area of the villages of Gikalovsky and Chechen-Aul, which began on the morning of February 3, 1995 from the Prymykaniya area (the eastern outskirts of Grozny). Its goal was to completely blockade the city of Grozny from the south, where until the specified time, starting from the moment of the assault on the Chechen capital, the so-called "green corridor" operated along which civilians were to be evacuated from the city. In fact, this corridor was used to feed the militants in Grozny with reinforcements, ammunition, food, and evacuate the wounded to secret bases in the highlands.

This corridor was also formed because a picture, paradoxical from the point of view of military art, emerged. The federal troops that surrounded the city in the first months did not have a numerical superiority over the militants, whose number at the beginning of hostilities in the republic was about 35 thousand people (of which about 15 thousand were the so-called presidential guard, the rest were part of the local militia) , while the combined grouping of federal forces numbered about 18.5 thousand people (data on the number of the opposing sides were borrowed by me from the military press of that period, as well as from the materials of the military-practical conference held in November 1995 in Yekaterinburg, organized by the headquarters Of the Ural Military District to summarize the experience gained). With such a balance of forces, it was not surprising that Grozny was only partially blocked by the federal group, and the fighting for the city continued for almost two months.

Having received the order to capture and hold the settlement of Gikalovsky, the commander of the 324th regiment, Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Sidorov, organized a move along the bypass road running along the southeastern outskirts of Grozny, through the suburban areas - Neftepromysly and Chernorechye. Before reaching Chernorechye, our column, marching in the vanguard, unexpectedly turned off the road into the forest plantation zone and, pressing against the soles of the dominant heights, began to crawl into the greenery like a winding snake. When the convoy had passed no more than 2 km, it was fired upon from mortars. The mines fell at a sufficiently large distance, which made it possible to observe the trajectory of their flight and not be afraid of being hit by shrapnel (the spread of mortar mine fragments reaches 200 m in radius). This meant that the militants noticed our column too late, so their fire turned out to be indirect. Our forward detachment, consisting of a motorized rifle company and two mortar crews, as well as a tank platoon, passed Chernorechye at speed, sweeping away the few pickets of militants on the way, and rushed along the highway to the village of Gikalovsky, between which and the outskirts of Grozny we did not meet any serious resistance. When our vanguard burst into Gikalovsky, no one expected him. The militants fled so hastily that they threw away all their property and documents. In the courtyard of the building there were boilers in which hot pilaf was still smoking. The soldiers, examining the building of the tribal state farm, where the headquarters of the militants was located, found lists of the personnel of the detachment of the field commander Isa Madaev, in whose area of responsibility were the southern outskirts of Grozny (each field commander had his own pre-assigned sector of responsibility, which made it possible to respond very quickly to movements of federal troops and ambush them). The trophies of the mortarmen were a staff van based on the GAZ-66, as well as several sets of field camouflage uniforms stylized as a mountain national costume. Several militants were taken prisoner and, after a short search and interrogation, were shot. There was no point in sending them to the rear, since we did not have one.

After the 3rd battalion broke through Chernorechye, the militants organized a tighter fire barrier, as a result of which not all units of the 324th regiment were able to slip through the greenhouse without losses. In our mortar battery, as a result of shelling, the car that closed the column, loaded with various field equipment, was knocked out. The remains of the car had to be transported in tow, attaching it with a cable to the BMP.

In the future, it was necessary to draw up an act for writing off the car and the property in it 5 times. This once again confirmed that bureaucracy in the Russian army flourishes even during hostilities, when the outcome of the case is decided not by a document, but by the real actions of people. We were given such "trust" that it turned out that we almost sold the car with the property to the same militants. Although the facts of the sale of weapons, equipment and ammunition took place during the first Chechen campaign, I myself and my comrades did not have information about such facts. It was necessary to repeatedly confirm the fact of the loss of property, although at the same time from Grozny, when the railway connection was restored, not without the knowledge of the high authorities, whole platforms were loaded with foreign cars, household appliances, furniture looted from abandoned houses in Grozny and in others settlements Chechnya. As the saying goes, "to whom the war, and to whom the mother is dear."

The Marine Regiment, which was supposed to follow the 324th regiment, faced heavy fire from the militants, was also unable to support the actions of our battalion that had broken through to Gikalovsky. As a result, by the evening of February 3, we were almost completely surrounded. It should be said that if Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Sidorov had decided to follow the marching column strictly along the indicated route, the regiment would have suffered huge losses, and the author of these lines would hardly have been able to write them.

Recovering from the first shock, the militants began to pull their forces to the Chechen-Aul village, located 3 km from Gikalovsky, and from there they began to disturb us, making periodic shelling, not allowing us to calmly dig in and take a breath. So the whole night passed. At 5 o'clock in the morning on February 4, 1995, the battle flared up with renewed vigor. First, the militants, hiding behind a thick veil of fog, went out through the thickets of elm and along the canal bed to the rear of the positions of a tank platoon located at the intersection of the Rostov-on-Don-Baku highway and the Grozny-Duba-Yurt highway, and almost point-blank shot two tanks from grenade launchers , and then quickly disappeared along the same path that they had come. The death of tanks and their crews was a consequence of the fact that at night the tanks were without cover for motorized riflemen, who were redeployed to the rear, by order of the regiment commander to cover the headquarters from the Urus-Martan side. The militants fired exactly at the upper part of the tower, where the ammunition was located, so the explosions were so powerful that the tower of one of the tanks was blown to the side by several tens of meters. Pieces of armor from another tank whistled over the heads of the mortar crews, one of whom pierced the breastwork of the trench where the battery control was located. The battery commander, Captain V.Yu. Arbuzov, took it and, in spite of the whistle of bullets flying over our heads, went and showed it to his soldiers, thus putting forward a weighty "argument" so that they would tear off trenches in full growth, and not like that, which were opened in the morning - the maximum in order to hide in them while sitting from bullets and shrapnel. Standing under the bullets on the breastwork of the trench, drowning out the noise of the shots, he used vocabulary "suitable" for the given situation, thereby instilling in the soldiers the awareness of the need to fulfill their military duty.

The militants' attacks on the positions of the 3rd battalion continued for 7 hours. Their direction was constantly changing, since the enemy was quite competently looking for weakness in our defense. It was found from the direction of Urus-Martan, whose elders declared neutrality at the beginning of the first Chechen campaign, provided that federal troops would not enter the village. Between Urus-Martan and Gikalovsky, the terrain is fairly flat, an almost flat field with small hills. On it, the militants deployed in a chain and moved directly to the position of the mortar battery, which was located in the second echelon of the battalion's defense stronghold. To repel the attack, it was necessary to temporarily stop the fire support of the motorized riflemen, who were holding back the enemy's onslaught from the Chechen-Aul and Duba-Yurt, and to transfer fire to the advancing chains, which did not bend down, just like in the film "Chapaev". The soldiers somehow dug trenches for mortars at night, but they did not have time for themselves, so they could not fire from machine guns in full force, without dooming themselves to certain death.

Several volleys of direct fire stopped the advance of the militants about 500 m from the firing positions of the mortar gunners. During the hitch, a platoon of motorized riflemen on the BMP-1 came to the rescue of the mortar men and, with joint fire with the battery, dispersed the combat formations of the Dudayevites. Attempts by the militants to break through into the depths of our defenses in vehicles were suppressed by crossfire from 7.62-mm machine guns mounted on the BMP. One of these vehicles nevertheless broke through the fire barrier close enough, but they set it on fire a hundred meters away. I saw how militants, engulfed in flames, jumped out of it, who were immediately finished off by the line of our machine gunners.

After the attack from the Urus-Martan side broke down, the militants, dispersed their forces, tried to strike simultaneously from three sides. The motorized riflemen really badly needed our fire barrier, so the guns on the mortar battery were distributed two in each direction, and officers led their fire, fearing that inexperienced gunners would cover the positions of their comrades when firing direct fire. At that moment, it turned out that the ammunition for the mortars began to dry out quickly, so it was necessary to urgently drive a car with mines, which was located behind the regiment's headquarters building, communication with which was lost. Captain V.Yu. Arbuzov sent me to carry out this assignment. To be honest, it was very scary to get out of the trench under the bullets. But the order had to be carried out, because without ammunition we would not have been able to provide adequate support to the infantry. In the future, there was the prospect of engaging in battle with notorious thugs who had received combat experience back in Abkhazia, while our fighters barely owned their AKSU-74, suitable only for close combat (after the battle it turned out that the well-known "Abkhazian battalion ", formed back in 1993 by Basayev).

Running across the open space and hiding behind a concrete fence, I was able to quickly find a car with mines, transfer our new radio call signs to the headquarters (the militants drowned out the frequencies on which they kept in touch with the headquarters until morning) and go back, showing the way to the driver of the mine-laden "Urals" ", who was very afraid to go to the open country. I had to walk in front of the car to show the driver that "the devil is not so terrible as he is painted." In addition, the feeling of fear for his comrades overcame his own instinct for self-preservation. The ammunition came in handy, and together with the battalion commander, we quickly organized their unloading, although only one successful bullet hit in the tip of the mine could send the entire battery to Allah.

Having received a worthy rebuff from 18-19-year-old boys, from whom seasoned militants did not expect such agility, the latter stopped further attempts to attack us head-on and retreated to Chechen-Aul, which for a long month and a half became a headache for the entire 324th regiment. The results of the battle were quite depressing. Our battalion lost 18 people killed, 50 received various injuries. The tank company lost 5 vehicles, which were mostly destroyed in the first minutes of the battle. The rest of the tanks were saved by taking them to reserve positions behind the motorized riflemen, who took the brunt of the blow. The militants lost about 50 people killed. It was not possible to clarify the number of wounded, since the militants took all of them with them, and after repelling the last attack, the regiment commander did not organize the pursuit of the retreating enemy, since he feared large losses and the possibility of being ambushed.

For another two days and three nights, the firefight continued, but both sides did not dare to take more decisive actions. On February 6, 1995, from the side of Chernorechye, a breakthrough was made by units of the 1st battalion of the 324th regiment with the support of the marines, as a result our encirclement was removed, and Grozny was finally blocked. A few days later, while listening to the radio, we learned that the BBC radio had broadcast a message that a "Ural special punitive regiment" had been sent to Chechnya. Since the Western media received information about the war in Chechnya mainly with the help of the separatists, this was a rather high assessment of the combat capability of our regiment. Later, as it turned out during negotiations with the elders of nearby villages, the militants christened us "red dogs" because our regiment firmly held positions and did not allow anyone to move freely within the mine's flight range (it is 7201 m). In addition, many officers in the regiment let go of their beards, which had acquired a reddish hue in the sun. Once again, the truism was confirmed that the East has always respected strength. When at the end of February 1995 units of the 503rd motorized rifle regiment from the Moscow Military District were located south of our regiment, the militants did not enter into any negotiations with them, but simply, giving a small bribe (a bottle of vodka, a block of cigarettes), drove through them. position in the desired direction. Such a thing in our regiment was unthinkable.

For a month and a half, starting from the departure of the units of the 324th regiment to the village of Gikalovsky, the militants fought grueling night battles. Every day, at sunset and until late at night, as on schedule, our positions were subjected to shelling and sorties were made to the front line of the defense. This was done in order to ensure the transfer of ammunition, weapons and reinforcements to the besieged Grozny. Mortar workers did not sit without work. Often it was necessary to simultaneously "process" the "green" in front of the positions of motorized riflemen in order to smoke snipers and the groups of fire support accompanying them from it. At the same time, they had to arrange a fire barrier on country roads, along which the militants transported vehicles with ammunition and other property for their accomplices in Grozny. To detect the enemy, the battery periodically illuminated the area at the forward edge with lighting mines.

As a result of raids behind enemy lines, the reconnaissance group of the Kyakhta special forces managed to find two field camps of militants, which were destroyed as a result of fire raids by our battery. The fire of the mortarmen was skillfully corrected by the commander of the control platoon, Senior Lieutenant V.G. Bednenko, who every night went out together with the special forces on a search. As a result of these raids, the militants lost about 110 people killed (the information was obtained as a result of a morning inspection of the places of the former militant camps). Since the radio communications were being tapped by the enemy, we used terminology from Fenimore Cooper's novels about the Indians of North America. In particular, the location of the reconnaissance group and our spotter was designated as "wigwam". VG Bednenko himself had the call sign "Glaz", the battery commander, Captain V.Yu. Arbuzov - "Chingachguk", and the author of these words - "Talking Hat" barely protruded from the trench so as not to get a bullet from a Chechen sniper).

Despite the dramatically changed tactical situation, especially after all the main centers of resistance were suppressed in early March 1995 and Grozny, the Dudayevites received a respite of at least two weeks, since an armistice was declared on March 1. While it lasted, under our noses, the militants built a well-fortified and engineering stronghold, which covered the approaches to the only stationary bridge across the Argun River, located in the middle between the villages of Chechen-Aul and Starye Atagi.

The examples given above suggest that the transfer of hostilities from the plains of Chechnya to the mountainous regions was deliberately delayed, since with the proper level of organization of the operation to "restore constitutional order" this was quite possible back in February 1995, after the city of Grozny was finally blocked. Until the snow melted in the mountains and the forests in the foothill part of Chechnya were not dressed with green foliage, the militant detachments were under the threat of missile and bomb strikes from the air, and their communications were limited only to river valleys and gorges, while on mountain and forest trails could collapse avalanches and drifts. This circumstance was taken into account only in the second Chechen campaign, but this is not the subject of our conversation. The deliberate dragging out of military operations in the spring of 1995, which took place in the form of moratoriums on the use of heavy weapons and equipment, the introduction of frequent ceasefires, allowed the militants to regroup their forces, replenish their supplies of food, fuel and ammunition, finally, recuperate and heal wounds received in fierce battles during the winter months of the war.

Moreover, the ceasefire only provoked the fighting activity of the separatists and contributed to the deployment of a guerrilla war against federal troops, even in those areas where the local population did not offer strong resistance during the first period of the campaign. One example of such a provocation was the artillery shelling of the positions of the 3rd mortar battery and the headquarters of the 324th motorized rifle regiment, which took place on March 2, 1995, in the village of Gikalovsky, located 12 km south of Grozny. The shelling was preceded by the appearance of a car with the CSCE emblems and flag at the intersection of the Rostov-on-Don-Baku highway and the Grozny-Duba-Yurt highway. At this crossroads, after the armistice was declared on February 28, 1995, on March 1, 1995, the exchange of prisoners of Russian servicemen for bodies took place. dead militants... Since the firing positions of the 3rd mortar battery and the headquarters of the 324th motorized rifle regiment were within line of sight from the intersection, the participants in the negotiations from the Chechen side were able to determine the coordinates of these units quite accurately. The next day, March 2, 1995, during lunch (the militants thoroughly studied the regiment's daily routine), when one of the two fire platoons of the 3rd mortar battery went to the field bath located behind the board of the Gikalovsky tribal state farm, and the other platoon preparing for a meal, a piercing whistle was heard, and soon in front of my eyes, about 150 m from the battery positions and 100 m from the headquarters building, an artillery shell burst (later it turned out that it was a 76-mm anti-aircraft gun). After just a few seconds, a second shell exploded. This time it happened almost at the headquarters building. This was followed by a third explosion. It happened behind the battery positions with a flight of about 50 - 70 m. The first confusion passed, and the officers who remained in the firing position organized an artillery duel. The dining soldiers rushed first to their shelters, and then, on command, returned fire from 120-mm mortars.

The problem was that we were shooting from closed positions (between us and the enemy there were thickets of bushes and forest plantations), so the platoon needed to adjust the fire. About a minute was wasted trying to get in touch with the headquarters of the 3rd motorized rifle battalion and to clarify at least a square on which a strike could be struck. After several volleys of three mortars, accompanied by radio adjustments from the forward positions of the 3rd motorized rifle battalion, the shelling of our positions ceased. But the most interesting thing is that immediately after the end of the firefight, they called from the regiment headquarters on the field telephone and menacingly asked who opened the return fire. And this is instead of using observers, who were usually located in the attic of the headquarters building and could conduct a more accurate adjustment of mortar fire than from the positions of a motorized rifle battalion, which were in the middle of thickets of bushes and forest plantations that made it difficult to observe the enemy.

Thus, it turned out that militants could shoot at the positions of the federal troops during the armistice, but the federals could not answer them. It turned out to be some kind of strange giveaway game.

To prevent further shelling of our positions by a special forces group from the city of Kyakhta (Zabaikalsky Military District) attached to the 324th regiment, reconnaissance was carried out on the outskirts of the village of Chechen-Aul, during which a camouflaged firing position was discovered, as well as the basement of a house in which the militants hid a 76-mm gun and ammunition. The coordinates were soon transferred to the mortar battery, and the 1st fire platoon (it was quicker to prepare for battle than the 2nd) directed its guns to a given target in advance. The 2nd fire platoon received as a target the area of possible withdrawal of the militants, after the latter had finished the shelling. This fire trap was triggered only after a week. This time, the shelling began at night, as the militants hoped for a drop in our vigilance during the truce. As soon as the second shelling of our positions began, with an interval of 1 minute, the 1st volley was struck with a volley. and then the 2nd fire platoon. It soon became clear that the militants had indeed begun to withdraw after our first return salvo, since the entire area of their evacuation was strewn with thrown bloody bandages. As for the gun, as a result of the shelling, it was damaged and thrown by the militants.

After this incident, the artillery shelling of the positions of the 324th regiment temporarily stopped. Another attempt was made by the militants only at the end of March 1995, when they deployed the Grad missile launcher at a distance of about 10 km from the regiment's positions (the Grad rocket launcher firing range is 21 km). But this time it was destroyed by a flight of helicopters called from a military airfield in Khankala, located in the suburbs of Grozny.

The senselessness of conducting hostilities in the Chechen Republic was proved by the behavior of the command of the federal group. On March 13, the 324th regiment launched an offensive against the positions of the militants in the area of the settlements of Chechen-Aul and Starye Atagi. The purpose of the offensive is to capture the crossing of the Argun River. As a result of the 8-hour battle, the militants were pushed back to the river, and their stronghold in the area of the small-scale commodity farm was practically destroyed. But as a result of a mismatch between the actions of the 1st and 3rd battalions, a gap of about 800 m was created between them. It could be closed by using the commandant company that guarded the regiment headquarters. But instead, it was decided to withdraw the units to their original positions.

On March 15, a second offensive began on the positions of the militants, who used two days to restore the destroyed stronghold, to the extent that they concreted trenches on the banks of the Argun River. The peculiarity of their equipment was that the trenches were located on the steep slopes of the river bank and were equipped with evacuation passages to the river. When shells and mines hit, the fragments scattered and went above the positions of the militants, as a result of which the fire training that preceded the offensive of the motorized riflemen of our regiment was ineffectual.

It should be noted that the militants did not wait for the advancement of our units, but prevented their deployment in battle formation on the way to their positions. Their favorite technique was wedging between companies and opening fire, first one by one, and then another company. While the companies were turning around and trying to retaliate, a group of militants, hiding in the thickets of bushes and in the channels of irrigation ditches, retreated to the main positions, and in the meantime a real battle broke out between our units, which was stopped only by the commander of the 3rd battalion, Lieutenant Colonel M.V. Mishin observing the deployment of units.

The offensive, which unfolded in the southeastern regions of Chechnya on March 24, 1995, was carried out with the massive use of aviation and artillery. Tanks were used as mobile artillery mounts, accompanying with fire the advancing battle formations of motorized riflemen. The classical combination of various types of troops with numerical and technical superiority ensured a rapid breakthrough in the positions of the Dudayevites, as a result of which federal units with minimal losses occupied almost all the flat regions of the republic and reached the foothills of the Greater Caucasus. But instead of pursuing the retreating enemy and inflicting a final defeat on him, the troops stopped again, since another ceasefire was declared again, which contributed to a more organized retreat of the militants to the highlands.

Throughout April 1995, the 324th regiment did not undertake active hostilities. Nevertheless, on average per day, as a result of the actions of Chechen snipers, 1-2 people in the regiment were injured or died. To combat snipers, a combat group on duty was assigned as part of a motorized rifle platoon on the BMP-1, which periodically combed the area around the regiment's location. This measure could not prevent the enemy's actions, since the regiment did not have its own specially trained snipers, and the special forces group from Kyakhta, attached to the regiment in February 1995, was withdrawn in mid-April. Thus, the fight against enemy snipers turned into an attempt to kill a mosquito with the butt of an ax.

A positive consequence of the ceasefire was that the soldiers were able to rest after exhausting night battles with militants, which lasted for almost two months, from late January to late March 1995. The negative was that discipline fell sharply, cases of unauthorized abandonment of positions became more frequent. which, with excessive curiosity of the soldiers, led to their death on their own or Chechen banners or as a result of the actions of "civilians".

At the beginning of April, a replenishment arrived in the regiment - about 200 people, which were distributed mainly between the 1st and 3rd motorized rifle battalions. Struck by the fact that the newly arrived fighters practically did not have the skills to handle a machine gun, not to mention the RPG-7 grenade launcher, PC machine gun or hand grenades. At the same time, training in battalions was organized in different ways. In the 1st battalion, the fighters from the replenishment immediately joined the subunits, and in the 3rd they were formed into three training platoons, the commanders of which were young officers, in order to consolidate the practical skills of unit management acquired during the recent battles. It is noteworthy that two of them were "jackets". Neither the 1st nor the 3rd battalions were without losses among the replenishment, even before their participation in hostilities. In the 1st battalion, on the very first night after arrival, two soldiers made a cross-fire (they shot themselves soft tissue legs). In the replenishment of the 3rd battalion, two weeks later, a young soldier, a Baptist by his religious convictions, hanged himself.

It is noteworthy that the soldier who hanged himself was assigned to the 1st training platoon, commanded by a young career lieutenant who had recently graduated from the Chelyabinsk Tank School. The style of his command was to humiliate the soldiers, to instill in them unquestioning obedience. A frequent occurrence was assault, swearing in front of the formation, senseless push-ups from the ground - and all this in front of the soldiers of other training platoons. It is not surprising that it was in his unit that this emergency occurred.

When conducting field exercises with young recruits, I noted that the soldiers are happy to perform exercises in firing from a machine gun and a grenade launcher, throwing grenades. They showed significantly less enthusiasm in digging and setting up trenches and conducting tactical exercises. In order to avoid an accident, weapons were not initially issued to them. It was only at the platoon commander, who, by firing a machine gun, taught the soldiers to a combat situation during field tactical exercises. A special impression was left from the running-in tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. In the middle of the track in the field, the soldiers dug trenches for prone shooting and were in them at a time when a tank first passed over them at low speed, and then an infantry fighting vehicle (at the latter, the landing was much lower, which made the soldier's position in the trench very "uncomfortable").

But the biggest revelation for me was that when my replacement, Lieutenant Misha Shankin, arrived, he also did not know how to handle a machine gun, although shortly before being drafted he completed a course at the military department of the Izhevsk Agricultural Institute. The question arises: why the career lieutenants break their hands not to go to Chechnya, leave the army, drive the soldiers to suicide, although they are the professionals in military affairs. In my opinion, it is necessary to radically change the principles and methods. educational work in military schools that do not fulfill their purpose. Hopes for "jackets" are illusory. Much depends on the excellent motivation of a reserve lieutenant who enters the military.

The return home took place as in a low-standard Soviet action movie about "Afghans". It all started with the fact that I had to receive a travel order literally from a car that was sent to Grozny. Without him, one would have to make excuses about the absence in their unit, and then prove the fact of participation in hostilities. This was followed by a continuation in the form of a car moving through half of Chechnya, moreover, in violation of all instructions and unwritten rules worked out in Afghanistan, the car went without combat escort, and I and my companions were deprived of standard weapons. My fellow travelers were wounded soldiers and officers who surrender their weapons during hospitalization, and I handed over my submachine gun to the commander. On the way to Grozny, the "nurse" kept going around potholes on the roads, and there was not even a soul at the checkpoints; if desired, the militants could take us prisoner without firing a single shot. This prospect "brightened up" the discomfort caused by the tightness in the back, stuffiness and scorching heat. The typicality of the picture was confirmed upon arrival at the Severny airport. We did not have time to get out of the car, when a drunken ensign came to meet us and offered to try medical alcohol... We prudently refused, the more so as the heat intensified by noon and we began to be tormented by thirst.

After I and my companion, Ensign Shalagin, who was leaving on leave for family reasons, checked in for a helicopter flight to Mozdok, we started looking for water. I was extremely amazed that a restaurant was already operating at the airport, the prices in which turned out to be very unaffordable, and the staff - all mostly "persons of Caucasian nationality" - did not even want to talk to us. An attempt to turn to the assistant military commandant for the airport for help ended with the fact that, in response to his rude refusal, I could no longer stand it and left, slamming the door, as a result I was detained by the called patrol and I was forced to humiliate myself so that my documents were returned and I was given the opportunity to commit landing on a helicopter. From this incident, I concluded that those on the front lines will never find common language with rear rats. We are only needed when we are cannon fodder. As soon as you begin to return to a peaceful life, you need to tune in to the fact that, apart from yourself and your loved ones, no one in this country needs you with their problems and only someone like you can understand you. We finally got water at the nearest roadblock, which covered the road to the runway. The guys shared with us their meager supplies, and the thirst that had tormented us in the morning was somewhat quenched.

A new surprise awaited us in Moscow, where a transport plane arrived from Mozdok. It turned out that the money that Shalagin and I had was only enough for half the ticket. We were not given military travel documents upon departure, and there was no money in the regimental cash desk to pay the advance payment. It was fortunate that while still in Mozdok we joined a group of officers and warrant officers of the 276th regiment, in which the replacement was carried out already from mid-April, and they were paid advances, due to which it was possible to get home. I found a fellow countryman living on Elmash and borrowed from him, which I returned the next day after arrival (the most interesting thing is that the train fare in the military unit was never paid for me, although I did not seem to return from the resort). This is how the Motherland greeted its sons, who had fulfilled their constitutional duty to it.

Indeed, our state continues to live outside time and space, repeating past mistakes and correcting them through the patience of the people. But the safety margin of Russian society has come to an end. I mean the margin of safety, first of all, spiritual. The blind and boundless devotion of the people to their state is giving way to the cynicism of the younger generation next. This cynicism is, of course, overcome when a person comes face to face with death. But in order to cure our sick society, we cannot drive it through the meat grinder of war, since, as you know, the best die on it, and such a medicine is very doubtful. It can hardly be called mentally and morally healthy and those who returned alive from the zone of local conflict.

Russia and the Soviet Union in local wars and armed conflicts of the 20th century: Scientific conference held by the Humanitarian University, the Ural State pedagogical university, Sverdlovsk Regional Union of Reserve Officers, Municipal Museum in Memory of Soldiers-Internationalists "Shuravi" April 13-14, 2002: Reports. Yekaterinburg: Publishing house of the Humanitarian University, 2002.S. 219-235